1 October 2025, 11:00 CET
Seminar Room 1.204
Andrej Smirnov
Nova School of Business and Economics
Vote buying is an impediment to development and democracy. It has been established that unfairly elected officials act more in their own interest, perpetuate corruption and reduce public good provision for the voters. However, there remain gaps in understanding how and why vote buying works, which is crucial to developing effective policies. Our study focuses on the enforcement channel, or how voters are convinced to sell their votes. Related studies either provide a theoretical framework or examine single enforcement channels. We aim to fill this gap by using a vignette experiment measuring the voting intentions of 759 war veterans in Angola. We compare the most common enforcement mechanisms: turnout buying, machine politics, reciprocity and questioning ballot secrecy (Nichter et al., 2013) and introduce a novel “signalling” mechanism. Our findings suggest that individuals only significantly increase their voting intentions by reacting to tangible enforcement strategies, such as threats to surveil voter turnout or questioning ballot secrecy. Promises of clientelist benefits in the future do not significantly alter voting intentions. This finding is robust across various dimensions of heterogeneity such as party affiliation, living in a rural area and participation in social networks. In our secondary list experiment, we estimate the true prevalence of vote buying to be around 40%. Taken together, these findings reveal important lessons for the design of anti-vote-buying policies. First, they should focus on strengthening (the belief in) fair and sound election procedures without external influence. Second, providing information about the negative consequences of vote buying and political information campaigns could be promising to reduce the efficacy of clientelist strategies.
Francisca Castro
ISDC - International Security and Development Center
The political instability of Peru during the 1980s and 1990s was characterized by internal armed conflict involving the Shining Path insurgency, resulting in severe political, social, and economic ramifications. Despite being an organization with substantial female participation and leadership, the consequences of their violence on political behavior, particularly women's electoral participation, remain understudied. This study examines how localized violence during the Peruvian Internal Armed Conflict affects women's representation in public office. Using data on casualties from the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission combined with historical electoral records, I estimate difference-in-differences TWFE models to evaluate how political violence influences women's likelihood of seeking office at the local level. Results show that districts experiencing state violence witnessed increased numbers of women candidates and women winning congressional seats. Violence by insurgent groups did not produce this effect. To examine local-level mechanisms through which political violence shaped both the supply and demand for women in public office, I conducted archival research capturing reported violence events in regional and national newspapers. This allows me to separate the effect of media coverage from direct exposure to violent events. Findings indicate that the influence of political violence operates independently of reported information levels, demonstrating that direct exposure rather than media coverage drives these effects.
Yaron Weissberg
Universität Konstanz
Because oil and gas are often associated with conflict, many observers expect the transition away from fossil fuels to yield peaceful benefits. However, there are also dangers lurking on the horizon, especially relating to the political stability of major oil and gas producing countries who rely on fossil fuel rents to maintain social order and legitimate their rule. Without the continued inflow of fossil fuel revenues, government spending has to be cut which could lead to protests, increased repression and even state collapse. To test whether these fears are legitimate, this paper tests the level of political violence of petrostates during previous periods of decline. Although some troubling signs exist at the national level, I argue that we need to focus on the sub-national level in order to grasp the true dangers. Using new data on oil and gas wealth and the geo-location of oil fields and pipelines, the analysis is able to delve deeper into the different mechanisms and explanations linking lower fossil fuel rents to political instability. Preliminary results show that petrostates overall face an increased level of civil conflict during times of decline. This increased risk of conflict takes places outside of the main oil-producing areas which have so far been at the focal point of the oil-conflict nexus.